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Abstract
We consider a simple general equilibrium model of the effects on
local development and factor price determination from the entry of a large
export oriented firm into a small community. The large firm has monopsony
power but is not a pure monopsonist in that it must compete with a local
service sector and an already situated export sector for its factor demands.
Each of these sectors are taken to be comprised of many small firms which
act as price takers in both the factor and product markets. Moreover, the
factor supply functions are general equilibrium in nature in that the price of
other factors as well as the price of local services act as determinants of
factor supply. We present an extensive example where we compute the
local general equilibrium and where we derive a community indirect utility
function which allows us to contrast the developmental effects under the
hypothesis that the large firm acts strategically In the factor markets with
the hypothesis that the large firm acts as a price taker. We conclude the
paper with a brief discussion of an intertemporal version of our model,
where the large firm, having superior access to the (nonlocal) capital
market, is motivated In part by a desire to capture arbitrage profit in the
land market. The intertemporal version appears to produce a more realistic
view of factor price determination than what emerges from static analysis.
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;
**Professor of Economics and of Management, Northwestern University.
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MONOPSONY, FACTOR PRICES, AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
by
Lanny Arvan* and Leon N. Moses
I. Introduction
This paper examines the developmental and factor price effects of
entry by a large, export oriented firm into a small community. The size of
the firm relative to that of the community is such that the firm's rate of
output and Its choice of Input combinations influence the prices it must pay
for local factors of production, land and labor. Because the firm has
monopsonistic power It adopts a profit maximizing strategy that involves
strategic quantity setting in the local factor markets.
The model used to examine these developmental and factor price
effects has two main characteristics. First, it is general equilibrium in
character It deals with the impact on the output, factor usage, and price of
a local goods and service sector from the large firm's entry into the
community. It also Investigates the effect the large firm has on the output
and employment of an existing export sector that, like the local goods
sector, is made up of firms that-'OPe-'atcmtst'iC'tnrboth their input^aml^utptrt
markets. The second characteristic of the model derives from the fact that
the large firm is not a pure monopsonist. it is dominant in local factor
markets but It Is not the exclusive employer, even after all of the effects of
entry by the large firm have been worked out and the community is In a new
long run equilibrium. In both respects the model Is a departure and
generalization of the traditional partial equilibrium monopsony model.
*Assoclate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;
**Professor of Economics and of Management, Northwestern University.
Sor far as we have been able to determine, there has been little work
done on extending the partial equilibrium approach In this manner. Two
exceptions are Bunting ( 1 962) and Stratton ( 1 985). Bunting performs a cross
sectional study to analyze the Impact of firm concentration on wages. He
finds that the anticipated negative sign of the firm size coefficient Is
absent. Indeed In most cases the coefficient Is not statistically significant.
Stratton reaches the opposite conclusion while working with a different
data set. A theoretical model which considers a dominant firm In a local
labor market has been advanced by Richards ( 1 983). However, his model Is
flawed In that he assumes the firms which comprise the competitive fringe
In the demand for labor have a perfectly elastic labor demand function. This
either rules out monopsony power by the large firm or rules out operation
of the competitive fringe.
In considering the impact of a large new firm on the development of a
small community the necessity to take account of general equilibrium
effects should be readily apparent. First, factor supply functions, in
general, depend on the prices of other factors as well as on the prices of
final prnduda^^nce entry by the large firm will affect these prices, the
large firm's behaviour can be thought of as shifting the partial equilibrium
factor supply function. As this shifting effect is not usually considered in
partial equilibrium analysis, such an analysis is incomplete. Second, the
factor demand function by the competitive fringe also depends on the prices
of other factors and the product prices of the firms constituting the
competitive fringe. The same caveat regarding curve shifting applies here
as well.
Regional scientists, economists, and planners have always been very
—mucti concerned with the Impacts of new Industry on communities and
regions. There Is a massive body of literature on regional and Interregional
Input-output and regional complex analysis that deals with such Impacts and
to which Isard ( 1 95 1 . 1 953. 1 965) has been a major contributor. Economic
base and regional multiplier models also directly address the issue of direct
and Indirect employment, and sometimes even land use effects of entry Into
an area of a new Industry. A fine summary of this literature Is provided by
Richardson (1985). An Important critique of local multiplier studies has
been given by Merrifield (1987). He points out that economic base theory
suffers from an unrealistic and unpalatable factor supply assumption;
factor supply functions, including that of land, are perfectly elastic. He
argues for the introduction of supply side constraints into such analyses.
There Is also a body of literature that deals directly with the question
of the different effects of entry by a large as against entry by a number of
small businesses into a community. For example Bowles (1982) in a study of
Appalachia finds that large absentee firms explains much of the area's
poverty. An approacbJto iQcal-Ctevelopment favoring the attraction of small
business known as the "Incubator approach" has received considerable
attention in the literature. ' Basquero (1987) in a study of the development
of local development in Spain contrasts the growth of indigenous small
firms to the entry by large firms which leave major centers of industrial
agglomeration to seek the factor price advantages of peripheral areas and
^ See Temalj and Can(tece( 1984). Small Towns ( 1985. 1986. 1987). Somers( 1986), Brower.
Pollard, and Propst( 1 986), and Thomas ( 1 986) who deal with the special problems of
development in small towns.
finds that much of the development of small zones in Spain resulted from
growth of the fonrrerr"'
^"'^''^^
Regional scientists do not appear to have had a great deal of interest
In modeling the large versus small firm issues in development. The regional
science literature does contain an immense amount of scholarly work
dealing with spatial problems of monopoly that arise on the product side.
Here one must mention the recent, all inclusive and immensely impressive
volume by Greenhut, Norman, and Hung (1987). However, we are unaware of
any comparable treatment which deals explicitly with departures from
perfect competition on the factor side.
The welfare Impacts of monopsony has been given some treatment in
the international trade literature. This work has been pioneered by
Feenstra (1980). McCulloch and Yellen (1980). and Markussen and Robson
(1980). Further work particulary interestested in the development of
multinationals has been done by Mendez ( 1 984) and Markussen ( 1 984).
Because these papers adopt the Hecksher-Ohlin assumption that factor
supplies are perfectly inelastic they are really incapable of examining the
developmeatal ancLXactor price effecta-of monopsony, the concern of our
paper.
II. A Static Model of Fntry by a Big Firm into a Small Community
H. I Setup of the Cieneral Framework
We consider a model of a small isolated community in which a large
firm plans to locate. The community's assets are its endowments of two
factors of production, land and labor, and its endowment of the numeraire 2
Prior to the entry of the largrflrm'thTcommuniti) has a small Industry
devoted to export to the rest of the country and a sector which produces
services that are consumed locally. It is assumed that both the export and
local goods sector operate under constant returns to scale. The proceeds
from export are spent on imports of commodities which are not locally
produced. Both the export and import prices are set on national markets vis
a vis which the local producers act as price takers. There is a third input
which is required in production, capital. The price of capital is also set on a
national market. In the short run the capital Input in both the export and
local goods sector Is fixed and the associated fixed costs constitutes a
liability for the community. In the long run each sector treats all Inputs as
variable.
The consumers in the community have preferences defined over
consumption of final goods; the export good, the import good, and the locally
produced good; as well as land and leisure consumption. Capital is not
consumed. It is assumed that each consumer has preferences which can be
represented by the same homothetic utilitity function. This assumption is
made for aggregation purposes. In what follows we will consider the
demand functions of the single aggregate consumer.
Let X| denote the export good, X2 the import good, x-^ the locally
produced good, K capital, L land, and N labor. Let the respective prices be
pj, ^2' P3> f^' ^' 3^^ W- P|> P2' ^^^ ^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^'^^ ^^^ P^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^
2 We assume that some of the community's endowment is held tn a commodity which is traded with
the rest of the country rather than assume that the entire endowment consists of land and labor
.
which are not tra(fe«j, so that there Is no indeterminacy in local factor prices vis a vis traded good
prices. See the Cobb-Douglas example presented in the next section for details.
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small community. For convenience take p^ = 1, i.e., the export good will be
treated as the numeraire, p^, v, and w are determined endogenously in the
local market general equilibrium. Assuming for the moment that this
general equilibrium Is uniquely determined, we can view these prices as
functions of the national market prices, the demand for inputs by the big
firm, and In the short run the levels of the fixed capital input. In the short
run the endogenous factor prices are given by
(1) V = v^(PpP2, r,L^,NV^,K3) and
w = w^(p^,P2. r,LV.K^,K3), - - -^.^-—
where L° and n" are the demands by the big firm for land and labor,
respectively and K| and K-^ are the levels of the fixed capital input in the
export and locally produced good sectors, respectively. Similarly, in the
long run the endogenous factor prices are given by
(2) V = v^(p|,p2. r,L^,N^) and
w = w'(p^,P2, mV),
Suppose that the product of the big firm Is sold exclusively on the national
market and that revenues of the big firm can be taken as a function of the
Joint Inputs, (K^.L^.N^). Call this revenue function R. Our analysis does not
depend on whether R Is derived by assuming competitive or imperfectly
competitive behavior in the big firm's product market. The problem which
generates the big firm's demands for inputs Is given by
(3) maximize R(K^,L^,N^) - rK^ - vL^ - wN^.
K^,L^,N^ 2
Ourjoal IS to contrast the solutions to (3) under two alternate hypotheses.
First, the big firm acts strategically with respect to the local factor
prices. That is the big firm is a muUimarket monopsonist acting as if v and
w are given by ( 1 ) in the short run or by (2) in the long run. Second, the big
firms acts competitively with respect to the local factor prices taking v
and w as fixed.
To pursue our goal it is highly desirable that (3) admit a unique
solution. For this reason we assume that R is strictly concave. Let the big
firm's-shortTun Tnput expenditure" function, E^, be given by
(4) E^(K^,L^,N^) = rK^ + vL^ + wN^,
where v and w are given by ( 1 ). Similarly, let the big firm's long run input
expenditure function, E
,
be given by
(5) E^(K^,L^,N^) = rK^ + vL^ + wN^,
where v and w are given by (2). It follows that strict convexity of the Input
expe^^ture function m.G_^^r).is-a'Suff1c1ent condition for uniqueness of a
solution to (3). We will return to the conditions which ensure this
convexity. We now turn to a more detailed development of the local,
general equilibrium which generates the equations ( 1 ) and (2).
Let the local endowment of land and labor be [ and N, respectively and
let the local endowment of numeraire be m. It Is Important to note that
while factor endowments are fixed the big firm will perceive that there is
some elasticity to factor supply functions. This follows because factors
have an alternate use other than In production. That Is, consumer
aprefernces depend on land and leisure consumption. It Is In this important
respect that our approach differs from the standard International trade
approach. Let the local utility function be denoted by U. U Is tai<en to
satisfy the standard neoclassical properties. Then the problem which
generates the consumer demands is given by
(6) maximize U(X|,X2,x-j,L,N)
X|,Xo,X3,L,N2
Subject to: X I + P2X9 + P3X3 + vL + wN = vL + wN + n | + n-^ + m,
where n^ denotes the profits earned in sector h for h = 1 or 3. This yields
demands of the form
** i* — — —
(7) ^
j
" ^
j ^P2^P3^^>'^'VL + wN + TT
J
+ TT-j + m) for i = 1 ,...,Z;
L^ = L^(P2,P3,v,w,vC + wN + n
I
+ TT3 + m); and
^c
"" N^^P2>P3^v>w,vL + wN *• TT| + rtj * m).
Let the production function in sector I be denoted by F and the production
function in sector 3 be denoted by 6. Then the problem which determines
the short run factor demands in sector 1 is given by
(8) maximize F(K |,L j,N j) - rK j - vL | - wN
|
LpN^iO
This yields short run factor demands of the form
(9) l'J= l'J(v,w,K|) and N^j = n'Jcv^w^Ki).
* *.
Then, n I = F(K|,L ^,N ^) - rK^ - vL ^ - wN ^.
We could proceed In a similar fashion with respect to the factor-
demands in sector 3. Since our primary concern is with the determination
of the factor prices and not with the indirect effect on the price of the
locally produced good, we will instead make a simplifying assumption which
greatly facilitates the analysis.
Assumption 1 : Capital is not used in the production of good 3. i.e.,
6(K3,L3,N3) = 6(0,L3,N3) for all K3.
Recall that we have assumed production in sector 3 is characterized by
constant returns to scale. In conjunction with assumption 1 this implies
that TT3 = 0, even in the short run. P3 will be bid up or down so that there
are normal economic profits in sector 3. That is,
(10) P3 = P3(v,w).
Thus, the purpose of assumption 1 is to reduce the number of endogenous
prices to be determined in equilibrium from three to two. Let C3 denote
the cost function In sector 3. Since It is assumed that there is no demand
for the locally produced good from outside the community it must be that
in equilibrium, P3X3 = C3(X3). Thus the factor demands in sector 3 are
given by
* ^3^3 ^ ^3^
( tl ) L3 = 03(v,w) —^ and N3 = [ 1 - 03(v,w)]—^
,
<i
where a-j(v,w) is the cost share of land in sector 3 production and
—\ - a^Cv.w) Is the cost share of labor in sector 3 production.
Factor market clearing requires that
P3^3
(12) L*>L%U =L!! + L%a^(v,w)^^^^^ = L - L^ and
N* * N^J + N3 = N^ + N^J Ml - a3(v,w)]~— = N - N^.
If the two equation system given in (12) is invertible, the inverse is then
given by ( 1 ). This completes the description of the short run local general
equilibrium.
In the long run sector 1 Just breaks even in the equilibrium prior to
the entry of the big firm. If the big firm enters at a sufficiently large
scale then local factor prices are driven up enough that sector 1 must shut
down. In this case sector 1 will revert to an Import sector just like sector
2. Then the long run equilibrium can be solved for in a similar manner to
the solution of the short run equilibrium, by assuming that production and
profit In sector 1 are both zero. Alternately, the big firm may enter at
small enough scale that sector 1 conlnues to operate, albeit at a smaller
scale. In this case the local factor prices may remain unchanged, with the
sector 1 local factor demands contracting to offset the local factor
demands of the big firm. This case is not germane to the present analysis
sine the welfare effect on the community from entry by the big firm will be
zero. Hence the community would have no Incentive to encourage the big
firm to enter In this case. It Is also possible that one local factor price Is
bid up while the other local factor price Is bid down. In genral the welfare
effects on the community are ambiguous when the factor prices move in
opposite directions. We brfefly consider this possibility in the subsequent
section.
11,2 A Cobb-Douglas Example
(n this section we develop a specific example which illustrates the
more general approach given above. Suppose
(13) U(X|,x^,x-j,L,N) = Qjlnxj + a-;,ln x>^ + ^3^^ ^3 * ^1
^^L
*
^N ^^^'
where a |, 02, Oj, a^, a^ > and a | + 02 + aj * «[_+ cx^ = ^ • Then the
consumer demands are given by
^ vC+wN+TT|+m
(14) X; =0; for i =l,...,3;
^ vL+wN+TTi+m
Lc = «L y
3^^
^ vC+wN+rr|+m
Nc =^N '^
^
Now suppose that the sector I production function is given by
(15) F(K|,L^,Np = K^^^L^^^N^^'^,
^ From ( 1 4) It can be seen that the purpose of the assumption that the consumer endowment
contains some of the numeraire good is to avoid the possibility that in the long run, when tt. = 0,
the consumer demands for land and labor depend only on the factor prices relative to each other
rather than on the factor prices in respect to the numeraire. See note 1
.
ta
Where pj^, p|_, pj^ > ana pj^ + p|_ + pj^ = 1. Then the short run factor
demands in sector 1 are given by
"^
™l h={[i]'-»'[5?fKM"^,„0
The short run profit In sector 1 Is
Finally suppose that the sector 3 production function Is given by
(18) 6(L3,N3) = L3^N3^"^
Then the factor market clearing conditions become
( 1 9) [a^_ * a3a]
•{[^]'"''[^r"KM"^-:-L«
.[..N.„K,[a.]'^"l^]^"''^-rK,.m
(a^ * a^{ I -0)]
and
13
Ihis r^t^er-messy system of equations is nonlinear in v and w.
Nevertheless, we can still come to certain conclusions about the example.
The Long Run Case
First consider the case where Kj = 0, as will certainly be true in long
run equilibrium when the big firm enters at a sufficiently large scale. .
Then(19)simplifiesto
(20) [a|_ + a^o] = L - L^ and
f^N'^3^''^^'
—
;;;;
— ^^"^
(20) is linear In v and w and consequently uniquely specifies the factor
prices as functions of the big firm's factor demands, as long as the
coefficient matrix Is nonsingular. in the domain where (20) admits a
sensible economic solution, we have
[a, *a^o][N-N^]m [aM*oci( 1 -ori-L^lm
'r2rT"^~ V = ^ ^
p
and w= ^ ^
where D = (L - L^][N - N^] - [C - L^)N[a^ + a3( 1 -a)) - L[N - nH\ * (x^ol
Certainly C - L^, N - N^ > is required for feasibility, I.e, the big firm does
not exhaust the factor endowment In equilibrium. Then (20) admits a
sensible economic solution when D is positive. This condition puts more
stringent upper limits on the the magnitudes of L^ and N^. In this relevant
range it follows that
14
dV dV dW aw
(22)
^ , ft , ^ , r1
^ ^'
dL^ dN° dL^ dN^
That is, an increase in demand for either input by the big firm bids up the
price of both inputs. Moreover, the factor prices are strictly convex
functions of the input demands by the big firm."* Since the market clearing
conditions, (20), imply that the big firm's expenditure is an increasing
aff ine transformation of the factor prices, the big firm's expenditure
function is also a strictly convex function of its input demands in this case.
Hence, when Kj = our example is amenable to the general analysis
developed in the previous section.
In order to compare the equilibrium where the big firm is a
monopsonist to the equilibrium where the big firm acts competitively it is
instructive to construct the indirect utility of the aggregate consumer as a
function of the local factor prices and then invoke the First Fundamental
Welfare Theorem. This indirect utility function, t, is given by
(23) t(v,w) = In [vL+wN-^m] - [aj_ + a^o] In v - [a^ * ^^^^ ~ ^M In w
The first paTtfats^omare given by
(24) t =-T—TT - —;;— andt^ = -:
—
tt-
;;;;
•
^ vL*wN+m ^ ^ vL+wN+m ^
From (20) tt follows that t^, t^^ > as long as L^, N^ > 0. That is, as long
as the big firm is actively participating in the local factor markets,
"^ All the analytic results are given in the appendix.
^Notethota. In p. =0 since p. =1. Also note that the term - a^ In p^ is omitted in (23).
Since p^ is constant throughout the onolysis, this is just o matter of convenience.
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welfare in the local community is an increasing function of the local factor
prices. From this it follows that the community is indeed better off by
having the big firm enter than by keeping the big firm out. Furthermore it
follows that at least one factor price must be lower in the monopsony case
than in the competitive case, because the First Welfare Theorem tells us
that the local community is worse off when the big firm acts as a
monopsonist.
Is it necessarily the case that both input demands are lower under
d^v
.
d^w .
..
d^E
monopsony? Note that both —3
—
z and —z—;: > 0. Hence —z—;; > as
3 P nf
well. Therefore, it Is possible that ^ \ - —z—-; < Oand,
apparently, one input demand might actually be larger under monopsony than
under competition, —z—;: - —;
—
;; 2 for all {l^M ) is a sufficient
condition for the monopsony solution to yield less demand of both inputs by
the big firm and, hence, lower input prices.
What is the impact on the locally produced good sector from entry by
the big firm? It follows. from, C IB). tl:iat
1-0
'«'
•3=erfei
Thus the price of the locally produced good rises as the big firm bids up the
local factor prices. It then follows, by substituting (25) into (1 4), that a
proportionate increase in both factor prices actually lowers the
equilibrium demand for good 3. Hence there is a tendency for sector 3 to
contract as the big firm enters, However, if the cost shares in sector 3 are
very uneven and if the big firm disproportionately bids up the price of the
factor which has the small cost share in sector 3. then it is possible for
sector 3 to expand upon entry by the big firm.
We now consider the case where K^ > after entry by the big firm.
«
That is, entry by the big firm occurs at a small enough scale that continued
operation by the old export sector is possible. Note that the average cost
function in sector \ is given by
C,(x,)
<^« ^-[mfiMg'"
I SPk"* "-Pl i^n'
Since good 1 is the numeraire and since the profits in sector 1 are zero in
the long run, as long as sector 1 is In operation the local factor prices are
constrained to satisfy
(27)
J.Y
In v + p|^ In w = H,
where H = pj/ In— + pj_ In p|_ p^ In ^^. From (27) it is evident that If
one local factor price is bid up the other local factor price must be bid
down. The change in w given a unit increase in v so that (27) remains
satisfied is given by
dw ^L w
(28) xw ~ ~ « ,. 'dv p,^ V
Then using (24), the welfare effect of such a price change is
17
P|_w / N 0(^*0C3(]-oX
(29) is positive if and only if
vL-[aj_+aja][vC+wN+m] wN-la^^+a-^C 1 -a)][\{]+wN+m]
(30)
Pl Pn
T^fe numeT<Jtm"iJT*tf!t5tef t hand side of (30) is the value of the excess supply
of land for the community, inclusive of the indirect demand for land in local
goods production but exclusive of the demand for land by either the
exporting sector or the big firm. The numerator of the right hand side of
(30) is similarly the value of the excess supply of labor. Thus the
community benefits from an increase in the price of land and a concomitant
decrease in the price of labor if and only if the ratio of the value of excess
land to labor supply exceeds the ratio of the land to labor cost shares in
sector I production.
If the local export sector continues to operate after entry by the big
firm the community will only invite the big firm in if (30) is satisfied and
the community expects the big firm to bid up the price of land or if (30) is
satisfied in reverse and the community expects the big firm to bid up the
price of labor.
Since n
j
= in the long run, ( 1 9) can now be written as
/T1^ r , vC^wN^m - H ^(31) [a^ + a^a]
—
*
Pl^i"^ ~^ ^^^
[Qj^ * a3( 1 -a)]
—
-
—
-
Pf^x ^ = N - N^.
where x^ is the output of the local export sector. Observe that if the big
firm expands Its demands of both land and labor so that—;: = — and If In
dL^ Pl
dx^ -1
the process the local export sector contracts its demands so that —z = —
,
dL^ ^L
then neither local factor price is affected. That 1s, as long as the big firm
increases its local factor demands in the correct proportion, then the big
firm views the supply of local factors as perfectly elastic, regardless of —
whether the big firm acts strategically or as a price taker in the local
factor markets. Thus when the local export sector continues to operate the
following first order condition is necessary at the big firm's optimum.
(32) Pl^R^ - V) + p,^(Rj^ - w) = 0.
Of course when the big firm acts competitively in the local factor markets
then both R, = v and R^ = w. When the big firm acts strategically this need
not be the case.
Note that the expenditure function E need not be convex In (L ,N ) as
long as the local export sector continues to operate. Thus we cannot rule
out multiple solutions to the big firm's problem In this case. However, It Is
not hard to show that for each output level of the local export sector, Xj,
there Is a unique (v,w) pair which satisfies (27), (3 1 ), and is profit
maximizing for the big firm.
Short Run Analysis
19
.
Obviously we cannot obtain an explicit analytic solution for the
-factor prices given by ( 1 9) when K| > 0. Nevertheless In the region where
(19) adnaits an economic solution this solution Is unique.^ Moreover it is
still the case that.
,^-„ dv aw
(33)
~d ' ~d > 0.
dv dw
However, in the short run it is possible that —-z ,—z < 0. In the long run
case bidding up the price of one Input raises the local demand for the other
input via Income effects. In the short run this effect is still present but
the demand for the other input in the export producing sector is reduced.
The export producing sector is squeezed by the increase in factor demand
from the big firm and responds by a decrease in its own factor demands.
Hence the overall effect on the local demand for the other input Is
ambiguous. Convexity of the factor prices in the big firm's factor demands
is still a sufficient condition for convexity of the the big firm's
expenditure function. Finally, the local community's welfare is increasinjg
in the local factor prices given that the big firm is taking a positive
position in the local factor markets. Thus the same caveats concerning the
monopsony solution in the long run case are also applicable to the short run
analysis.
^ Apart from restrictions on the size of the big firm's factor demands it Is necessary that the level
of the fixed ijapltd) input In the export producting sector not be too large. By limiting the size of
the fixed cost In this sector positive net wealth of the community can be ensured.
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IN. An Intertemporal Approach
While the static model developed in the previous section is an
improvement on the partial equilibrium approach to monopsony, it appears
somewhat at odds with some stylized facts concerning the way local
communities in the United States appear to woo large firms. Casual
empiricism suggests that small communities try to attract large firms
because they expect a substantial boon to local employment and because
they also anticipate a concomitant increase in local land values. While the
static long run model predicts increases in both factor prices relative to
the preentry equilibrium, the strategic behavior by the large firm
seemingly mutes these effects. Yet recently it appears that big firms often
pay the national Industrial wage upon entry into a small community. If this
is correct then this fact would appear to be at odds with the predictions of
our static model.
Recent theories concerning "efficiency wages" may explain why the
big firm finds it advantageous to pay such high wages when it possesses
monopsony power7 But if we are to rely on efficiency wage theory to
explain the high wages offered by the big firm, and note that the local
reservation wage is likely to be substantially lower than the urban
reservation wage even after entry by the big firm, then there is only the
land market In which the big firm can exercise its strategic power. But as
we have already noted, there is the anticipation that local land values will
rise substantially as well. We believe that there is something else going
i
^ For a good survey of the efficiency wage literature see the volume edited by Akerlof and Yellen
(1986).
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here. Below we provide a possible explanation consistent with these
stylized facts. ~
Our point of departure Is In the assumption that the big firm has
better access to credit markets than does the local community. This
assumption, together with the knowledge that local factor prices will rise
as a consequence of its entry, provides the big firm with an incentive to act
as an arbitrageur in the land market. That is, prior to the time that the big
firm has established its operation in the local community, the big firm buys
up land in excess of what is needed for its operation. Once its operation
has been fully established and local factor prices have been bid up as a
consequence, It sells back the excess land to the community and thereby
earns a handsome profit
If this channel for excercising strategic power is open to the big
firm then the big firm should base its location choice, in part, on the
community's access to credit, preferring more isolated unknown locations.
Moreover, if the land market is vertically integrated with the local goods
and services market then this form of arbitrage will take the form of the
big firm becoming a signifigant pjayer in local industry. In other words,
this theory is consltent with the notion of the development of a company
town.
To get an idea of how this arbitrage works consider an infinite
horizon, discrete time model. Suppose that In each period the model is
similar to the static model developed in section II. 1 That is, the utility
function, U, is now to be Interpreted as the per period utility function and
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time preference for the community is determined by the discount rate 5.8
In the period prior to its operation the big firm buys up land iTTthe
~
community but does not participate in the local labor market. Assume that
in all subsequent periods the big firm is in operation and a stationary
equilibrium is established.^ The per period equilibrium of all periods but
the interim period, in which the big firm buys up land, is described by the
static model we have already developed with the exception that the
community's endowment of land is now net of what it sold to the big firm in
the interim period and the big firm now may be a supplier rather than a
demander of land.
Let Vg be the stationary equilibrium rental price of land and let i^ be
the long run interest rate in the community. Then the stationary
equilibrium land price, p^, is given by
(34) Ps— ^S-
Similary, the interim equilibrium price of land in the community in the
period when the big firm buys up land, Pj, is given by
Ps ^*^ ^S
^^5^ Pi=^r M;=^r 7^17^
Q This Intertemporal additive separability of preferences implies zero intertemporal cross price
effects In demand, which greatly facilitates the analysis.
^ This requires that the long run interest rate which the community faces equals the community's
rate of time preference.
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where Vj is the rental price of land and ij is the short run interest rate in
the interim periodJ^
'^^s
^
^l
^^cause the big firm's demand for labor is—
sufficient to bid up the price of land in the long run, more than offsetting
the arbitrage in the land market by the big firm, then there is a capital gain
in land as long as ij i ic. We take this as our starting point.
Assume that consumers in the local community have rational point
expectations as to the long run equilibrium prices once the big firm is in
operation. The question which concerns us here is how does strategic play
by the big firm once it is in operation impact on the price of land in the
interim period? In particular, for a given level of land purchased by the big
firm in the interim period, how does an increase in the big firm's long run
demand for labor or a decrease in its supply of land affect P|? It turns out
that P| is likely to be inelastic with respect to such strategic moves by the
big firm and to be more inelastic the smaller is the community's elasticity
of credit.^ 1
Consider the extreme case where all loans in the community are
self-financing, so that in the absence of entry by the big firm the
community must maintain balanced trade with the rest of the world. We
will show that In this extreme case such strategic play by the big firm has
no effect at all on V|. Let L^ denote the amount of land bought up by the big
firm in the interim period Then the stationary equilibrium with the big
firm In operation is determined by the same set of equations that we have
I ^ Since we are abstracting from any considerations of risk , the short run interest rate will
depart from the long run interest rate only if the community's supply of credit is imperfectly
elastic.
'
' Of course, when the supply of credit to the community is perfectly elastic the anticipated
increase of the land rental price will bid up p. substantially. In this case, p^ will exceed p. only
by the difference between v^ and v..
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already examined In the static model, with the exception that the
comrriunttg's endowment of land In this stationary equilibrium Is given by
C - L J and the big firm may very well be a net supplier of landJ^ since
there are no Intertemporal cross price effects In demand, the local
community's demand for land and labor services In the Interim period Is a
function of the exogenously given prices of the Imported and exported
goods, the Interim period rental prices, Vj and Wj, as well as the lifetime
1+iq WqN+m
wealth of the community, P|C + WjN + m + t— —: =
"^^" Ulq VqL+WcN-^m
VjL + WjN + m + Tj-j- : . Moreover, given our restriction on
preferences, there is a unique pair of factor prices and level of community
wealth which gives rise to a given land and labor demand pair. Now
suppose In the interim period consumers In the community rationally
antlcpate a long run Increase in the big firm's demand for labor but witness
no change In the amount of land the big firm buys up In the Interim period.
This Increase In labor demand will bid up w^ and v^. However, from the
above V| and W| should remain unchanged Thus, in this extreme case ij
adjusts so that the community perceives no Increase in Its lifetime wealth.
In other words, in this extreme case rationally anticipated changes in the
big firm's stationary equilibrium behavior will have no effect on the
Interim rental prices. Such changes will manifest themselves only through
the changes In the short run Interest rate. Indeed, If v^and l+ij Increase In
the same proportion then there is no change In p, whatsoever.
'- This would be the case If the amount of land t)ought up In period I exceeds the Pig firm's use of
land In production.
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The point here is that in deciding on its optimal strategic play once it
has obtained full operationthe big firm can more or less ignore the impact
this play has on its preentry price of land. Since in the long run
equilibrium the big firm is operating as a monopsonist in the labor market
but as a monopolist in the land market it is quite conceivable that the long
run wage is competitive or even supercompetitive and that land prices are
quite high.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have been concerned with developing a general
equilibrium framework for analyzing the impacts of entry by a large firm
into a small community which is consistent with the notion that
communities bid to attract such firms because they generate substantial
income locally. Far from feeling that we have offered a complete analysis,
we hope that our paper will stimulate further work in the area. Below we
present some points in which the current analysis is deficient and which
might prove fruitful for study.
First, this paper completely Ignores the effects of labor migration
Into the community from adjacent areas. Such effects are obviously of
great Interest to regional scientists. Moreover, reconciling such migration
with the fact that big firms pay high wages Is all the more perplexing
because It would seem that the such labor migration would make the big
firm's labor supply more elastic than is suggested by the analysis in this
paper.
Second, other channels apart from different access to credit markets
should be explored in regard to the big firm's ability to act as an
arbitrageur in the land market. In this paper we have ignored the fact that
prior to entry by the big firm, the local community is typcially in
competition with other communities for the plant that the big firm will set
up. Such competition may lend an air of uncertainty which is absent in our
model. Is it conceivable that the big firm can utilize this uncertainty of its
location choice to aid it in land speculation?
Finally, we have not addressed the issue of community size. In other words,
in the static framework a sensitivity analysis on how the big firm's profits
vary with the basic parameters of our model would be of great interest.
Furthermore, while we have argued that the big firm would like to enter a
community which has limited access to credit markets in the intertemporal
model, obviously the big firm would prefer that its labor supply is
plentiful. An examination of how this tradeoff affects the big firm's
location choice would also be highly desireable.
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Appendix on Cobb-Douglas Example
I
Long Run Analusls
Since D = [L - L^][N - N^] - [L - L^]N[aj^ ^ a3( I -a)] - C[N - N^jfa^ - a^o] and
since C - L^. N - N^ > 0. It follows that
.d_M r-id.nN - N" - NlQj^ * 03(1-0)] > and L - L^ - L[a|_ * 030] >
are necessary conditions for D > 0. Then the precise comparative static
results are
(3V V - r» -
—
j= p{N-N'^-Nla,>j + a3(l-a)l}>0 and
av_ V .[L-L^]N[a,^*a3(l-o))
dN N-N"^
}>0
Next we can optain the second partials as follows
d^v
= 2— {N - N^ - N[aK, * aM-o)])^ > 0,
dL
d2 D^^ "^N--3^
a^v y^Nia^+a3(l-a)]
dL^aN^ "dI N-N' }
2 -^ {N-N^-N[a^ - a^{ 1 -o)])[ r^ ) >
J{N-N^-N[a,^*a3(l-a)]rL-L^]
because g > 1 , and
Moreover, —2
—
2 " L ~~d~~d J "
-7 {N - N^ - NlQj. - a^C 1 -o)]f ( r-V? 1
-
^v^MM(1M^ n r
[L-L^]N[a^>a3(]-a)]
^^
N[a^>a3(i-a)]
^ _
3^ {N-N^-N[a, ^ a3( 1 -a)]}{ rV ) (
. . d 1
:l-l^]ni
^2
^
[[-L^]N[a;^^a3(l-a)]
^
1
D
1
^1^ )) ' ^N-N^
{N-N^-N[a^j>a3(l-a)]rL-L^]
where the last Inequality follows because ^
I!
and
N[aj^+a3(l-a)]
N-N
^ < 1. This demonstrates that v is strictly convex and
increasing in the big firm's factor demands when these factor demands are
in the relevant range. Since the equilibrium is symmetric the same results
also apply to w.
Short Run Analysis
The market clearing conditions (19) can be rewritten as
[a^ + a^o]
vL+wN+n,+m
Jt _ H
+ L 1 = L - L° and
vL+wN+TTi+m ^
_ H
[a,^ * a^{\ -0)1 ^;p^— - N^ = N - N^.
Existence of a solution follows by standard arguments since the demands
are well behaved. For uniqueness of a solution consider the Jacoblan of this
system
-[a|_+a3a][vL|+wN+n|+m] dL «.
)i
[a|_+a3a)[N-N|] dL
dv dw
*, *»
[aj^+a3(l-a)]|C-L|] dN| -[a|^+a3(l-o)]lv{.+wN|+nYm) dN|
w dv W" dw
This Jacobian is nonsingular. Indeed the matrix is negative definite since
it is the sum of
-[a|_+a3<7l[vL ^+wN+Tr|+m]
w
laL+a3a]lN-N^]
[a,^+a3( I -a)]C-L*l
"t<^M''^3^ ^ -a)][\{.+wN'J+TT ^+m]
w
and
dL^ dL
dv dw
dN| dH
L dv dw J
both Of which are negative definite. This implies that each solution is
Isolated, it also implies the comparative statics results suggested in the
text In (25).
Next consider the function H given by
H(v,w) = ML - L^] - [a|_ * a^o] [vC ^ wN + tT| + ml - vL^J)^ *
{w(N - N^l - [a,^ * a3( 1 - ^)1 [vL + wN * TT
J
+ mj - wN*}^.
Note that from (1 6) and (17) it follows that tT|, vL|, and wN^ are all
strictly concave in (v,w). Hence H(v,w) is convex in (v,w). Moreover for v/
fixed H explodes as v approaches either or <». Similarly for v fixed H
explodes as w approaches either or <». it follows that H attains its
minimum over the first quadrant at some strictly positive (v,w) Moreover,
the set of such minimizers must be convex, in fact any solution to ( 1 9) must
Vbe such a minlmlzer of H because H Is obviously nonnegative and is zero at a
solution to (I9X It follows that the solution to ( 19) is unique.
i

